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HOMELESSNESS: A POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY FACES A
LEGISLATIVE DILEMMA
by
ROBERT W. COLLIN* AND DANIEL J. BARRY"
INTRODUCTION
In American social welfare history, the intent with which one became
poor has determined their eligibility for aid from the state.' This intent has
never been clearly labeled as such. Rather, it has taken the form of equating in-
tentional poverty with those "voluntarily in need,"2 not truly needy or "willful-
*Associate Director, Center for Legal Studies on Intergovernmental Relations; LLM-Urban Studies,
University of Missouri; Masters of Urban Planning, Columbia; Masters of Social Work (Administration),
Columbia; J.D., Albany Law School.
**Masters of Urban Planning and Masters of Public Policy, candidate - 1986, Princeton University; J.D.
University of Virginia.
'WALTER I. TRATTNER. FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE (2nd ed. 1974). People were expected to look
out for themselves and their families. If financial difficulties arose, they would turn first to their relatives
and families, just as they do today. If these resources were inadequate, the community was morally obliged
to share with them through the poor law. Town officials were justified in seeing that people did not evade
their responsibilities. The basic mode of service delivery was for each family to care for a poor person for
part of the year. People who were only temporarily in need received outdoor relief, which meant only in
their own homes. Sometimes they were auctioned off after the town meeting.
Early American society was strongly influenced by Calvinism. The Calvinistic interpretation was hierar-
chial. Destiny determined one's rank, and it was through one's work that destiny prevailed. If one had no
work, then they were instruments of the devil. Intent was deduced from the employment status of the in-
dividual. As the population increased, and the social life of the colonies grew more varied, the problem of
dependency became more complex. The need for a permanent, carefully regulated social welfare policy
became obvious.
'In New York provision for assistance to the needy is not a matter of legislative grace; it is specifically man-
dated by their Constitution. N.Y. CONsT. art. XVII, § I provides that:
[tihe aid, care, and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by
such of its subdivisions, and in such a manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to
time determine.
As noted in Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7-8, 405 N.Y.S. 2d 728, 720-31 (1977), comments by Edward F.
Corsi, chairman of the Committee on Social Welfare, in the adoption of the provision by the Constitution
Convention were persuasive. Mr. Corsi states:
Here are the words which set forth a definite policy of government, a concrete social obligation which
no court may ever misread. By this section, the committee hopes to achieve two purposes: First: to
remove from the area of constitutional doubt the responsibility of the State to those who must look to
society for the bare necessities of life; and, secondly, to set down explicitly in our basic law a much
needed definition of relationship of the people to their government...
The Legislature may continue the system of relief now in operation. It may preserve the present
plan of reimbursement to the localities. It may devise new ways of dealing with the problem. Its hands
are untied. What it may not do is to shirk its responsibility which, in the opinion of the committee, is
as fundamental as any responsibility of government.
Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York, Vol. III, 2126 (1938). Judicial
interpretations of Article XVII, § I have distilled and clarified the meaning of this Constitutional directive.
Aid is to be provided to all those individuals who are "involuntarily needy"; but it is properly within the
realm of legislative discretion to deny aid to employable persons who are deemed not "needy" because ,they
have wrongfully refused to avail themselves of an opportunity for employment. Such individuals are deeied
to be "voluntarily in need." Barie v. Lavine, 40 N.Y. 2d 565, 388 N.Y.S. 2d 878, (1976). Furthermore, tl b.
denial of aid to admittedly "needy" individuals on the basis of criteria having nothing to do with need is also
forbidden as a violation of Article XVII, § 1. Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y. 2d 1, 400 N.Y.S. 2d 728 (1977).
The legal distinction between the "voluntarily" and "involuntarily" needy was first recognized and de-
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ly unemployed." 3 There has not been a distinction between the intention with
which one seeks aid, and the intention with which one becomes poor. Recent-
ly, such a distinction is emerging in new homelessness legislation. However,
the new poverty legislation which grapples with intent will be doing so in a
post-industrial society. Intent minimally denotes some type of control over
one's life, but the ability to control one's life decreases in a post-industrial soci-
ety. As will be discussed, this dynamic has many implications for poverty leg-
islation.
The main problem caused by the blurring of states of intent for public
assistance is the failure to aid the needy.' It also exacerbates economic class dif-
ferences.' In addition, income-maintenance programs effect the bargaining
fined by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in its consideration of the Barie case, where
Justice Herlihy stated:
While the objective facts of hunger and a lack of sufficient assets to provide for one's own food,
shelter and clothing establish prima facie a "needy" person, nevertheless, the word "needy" does not
in its ordinary meaning encompass a person who is creating the need by consistently avoiding or
refusing to provide for his needs.
48 A.D. 2d 36, 38, 367 N.Y.S. 2d 587 (1975); affd 40 N.Y. 2d 565, 388, N.Y.S. 2d 878 (1976).
'N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131(5) (McKinney 1986), provides that no assistance or care shall be given to an
employable person who has not registered with the local employment agency or has willfully refused to ac-
cept employment in which he is able to engage. Regulations promulgated pursuant to this statute provide, in
relevant part, that one who, without good cause, fails or refuses to accept manpower services and certifica-
tion shall be disqualified from receiving assistance for 30 days (N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, §§ 385.7(a)(2),
385.8(b)(1) (1979). Under the foregoing provisions it is clear that a "refusal to accept manpower services and
certification" must be willful or without good cause.
However, judicial definitions of "willfullness" have stretched beyond its common meaning. One of the
authors of this Article discussed this issue in a previous article.
Illustrative of judicial interpretation of "willfullness" is the case of Woods v. Fahey, 84 A.D. 2d, 619,
444 N.Y.S. 2d 252 (1981).
In New York State certain categories of state Home Relief recipients are required to "work off' or
"earn" their Home Relief grant through Work Relief in public works projects. The amount of time
the recipient must work is determined by dividing the Home Relief grant by the minimum hourly
wage. In Woods, the plaintiff was a single, elderly women who had documented illnesses of diabetes,
hypertension, and arthritis. In this particular instance she had missed nineteen of the seventy-six work
hours requirement. On other occasions she had worked overtime to make up the few hours she had
missed. Though bedridden and without a telephone, she gave dimes to her friends to call and notify
her supervisor at the public works project of her illnesses. Citing a case in which the recipient had
missed a job referral where it was determined at a fair hearing that she did so without good cause. The
Appellate Division held, "We also reject petitioner's constitutional challenge to the sanction of 30
days ... and conclude that it is neither arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse of discretion." At-
tributing willfull poverty in this instance does not consider circumstances beyond the control of the
individual. Attributing willful refusal to work to an individual who had worked overtime in the past
smacks off judicial arbitrariness.
Collin, Homelessness: The Policy and the Law, 16 URB. LAW. 317, 326-27 (1984). It is decisions such as these
that move poverty issues from the courts to the legislatures.
'Poverty rose steadily over a five year period, from 1979 to 1983. In 1976 and 1977, before the rise in pover-
ty began and at a time when the unemployment rate was at comparable levels to 1984, the poverty rate was
11.6% to 11.8%. Although unemployment is now down to 1976 and 1977 levels, the poverty rate is nearly
three percentage points higher. SLICES OF THE PIE, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, 10-12(1986).
'The new census data show that the gap between upper income and lower income American families was
wider in 1984 than at any time since the Census Bureau began collecting this data in 1947. The poorest 40%
of United States families received just 15.7% of the national income in 1984, the lowest percentage the Cen-
sus Bureau has recorded since 1947. The top 40% received 67.3% of the national income, the highest
percentage ever recorded. SLICES OF THE PIE, at 5.
[Vol. 20:3
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power of workers in the labor market.6
The main result of the failure to aid the needy is the rise in the number of
homeless individuals in American society.7 The problem of homelessness has
reached such national proportions that state legislatures have begun to react.,
It is in this context that the blurred states of intent clash with the emerging
homelessness legislation.
BACKGROUND OF HOMELESSNESS
One of the early causes of homelessness in the United States were state
policies regarding the treatment of mentally ill individuals. This policy was
called "deinstitutionalization." Estimates of the number of homeless persons
who are mentally ill are inconclusive.9 Deinstitutionalization meant that
psychiatric hospitals released inpatients who did not require supervision, and
restricted admissions of mentally ill persons who may not have required such
supervision.10 This policy evolved on a state by state basis, with New York and
Massachusetts taking the lead.
The major forces behind deinstitutionalization were, discontent in the
psychiatric profession with institutional modalities of treatment,"' the in-
troduction of anti-psychotic drugs, 2 cost-saving concerns of conservative
policy-makers, 3 and liberty concerns of liberal policy-makers. 4
Many psychiatrists felt that the mental health institution helped to perpet-
uate the very pathology it was designed to cure. That is, the institution failed
to prepare the mentally ill person for re-entry into the mainstream of society.
6"... it [is suggested) that income-maintenance benefits support wage levels despite high unemployment. The
reason is simple. If the desperation of the unemployed is moderated by the availability of various benefits,
they will be less eager to take any job on any terms. In other words, an industrial reserve army of labor with
unemployment benefits and food stamps is a less effective instrument with which to deflate wage and
workplace demands." F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR, (1982).
7See NEVER AGAIN: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION TASK ON THE HOMELESS 15-18.
See generally Collin, supra note 3.
'See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 450 (West 1976).
'The Federal InterAgency Task Force on the Homeless has estimated that there are 30,000 homeless nation-
wide. The Community for Creative Non-Violence has estimated that there are 2.5 million homeless nation-
wide. Most other estimates fall between I and 2 million.
"'Basuk & Gerson, Deinstitutionalization and Mental Health Care Services, 238 Sc. AM. 46, 53 (1978).
"See, e.g., A. DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATE (1948); E. GOFFMAN. ASYLUMS (1961).
"in 1954 chlorpromazine was marketed in the United States under the name thorazine. In 1955, for the first
time in 100 years, the number of patients in state mental hospitals declined. See Brill & Patton, Analysis of
the 1955-56 Population Fall in New York State Mental Hospitals During the First Year of Large Scale
Tranquilizing Drugs, 114 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 509,511 (1957); Brill & Patton, Analysis of Population Reduc-
tion in New York State Mental Hospitals During the First Four Years of Large-Scale Therapy with
Psychotropic Drugs, 116 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 495 (1959).
"Rubin, An Economic Analysis of Litigation and Legislationfor the Handicapped. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH. DISABILITY AND HEALTH ECONOMICS RESEARCH 102 (1976).
'Proponents of the liberty interests of mentally ill people propelled the implementation of deinstitutionaliza-
tion. Due process of law is violated if one is deprived of liberty for the purpose of treatment, but does not ac-
tually receive such treatment. See generally Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
Winter, 1987] HOMELESSNESS
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Instead, the mental institution created its own society with norms and values
dependent on the personalities of the participants. Many of the participants ex-
hibited pathological behavior, therefore the institutional society developed in
ways that were much different than mainstream society. Because the mentally
ill person adapted to the institutional society, and felt secure there, re-entry in-
to mainstream society was difficult. This was, and is, especially true given the
stigma mainstream society places on mental illness. Many professionals in this
area considered deinstitutionalization an appropriate alternative.
A concern of mainstream society is that mentally ill persons not harm
either themselves or others. Traditionally, this required constant supervision
which was generally translated into institutionalization. When behavior-
modifying drugs were introduced in the United States in the middle of 1950's
the threat of harm by the mentally ill to themselves or society was lessened.
Since the threat of harm was lessened so to was the need for constant supervi-
sion, or institutionalization.
Public policy makers were very concerned about the issue of mental ill-
ness. It was considered costly and an infringement upon individual liberty.
Proponents of community-based facilities successfully argued that the care
given in their facilities was less expensive than that in large institutions. Pro-
ponents of the liberty interests of mentally ill individuals were able to persuade
judges and legislators that the mentally ill had a right to treatment in the least
restrictive environment. Liberal and conservative concerns merged to effec-
tuate deinstitutionalization as state policy.
Most communities have strongly resisted the placement of homes and
half-way houses in their community. They do so for a variety of reasons, the
two foremost being fears of lowered property values and increased crime. 5
They do so in a variety of ways. One of the most common ways is through the
use of restrictive ordinances. These ordinances limit and otherwise prevent the
placement of community-based facilities in most communities, especially areas
zoned for single-family residences. Often these ordinances are illegal, but need
to be litigated before their illegality can be determined. 6 This is very dependent
upon the ability of proponents of community-based facilities to garner the
time, expertise, and money necessary for litigation. More often than not, the
costs of litigation prevent a determination of invalidity of the ordinance in
question.
The lack of low cost housing is another causal factor of homelessness. The
National Housing Law Project has stated that two and one half million per-
sons a year are involuntarily displaced from homes. 7 Also, 500,000 units of
"See Tuoni, Deinstitutionalization and Community Resistance by Zoning Restrictions, 66 MASS. L. REV.
125 (1981).
"See Collin, supra note 3, at 320-21.
11C. HARTMAN, D. KEATING, & R. LEGATES, DISPLACEMENT: How TO FIGHT IT, 3 (1982).
[Vol. 20:3
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low-income housing are lost each year due to the collective forces of abandon-
ment, arson, conversion, demolition, and inflation. 8 The Census Bureau's An-
nual Survey of Housing placed the number of households with two or more re-
lated families sharing space at 1.9 million in 1982, up from 1.2 million previ-
ously. 9 This represents a 58 percent increase, the largest since 1950.0 Clearly
these trends, combined with increases in mortgage foreclosure rates and in-
creases in the proportion of personal income paid for housing, indicate a grow-
ing national need for basic shelter."' Furthermore, the dynamics of urban eco-
nomics wreaks special havoc upon low income populations, leading to home-
lessness."
Recent trends in employment are associated with homelessness. As
unemployment benefits run out individuals may travel to seek employment
and, when they find none, become homeless. Structural, and long-term
unemployment statistics indicate a declining demand for low-skilled labor.
Homelessness may be the first sign of the declining labor market demand that
characterizes post-industrial, technological societies.3
Another factor contributing to the growth of the homeless populations is
the reduction of federal disability benefits. 4 Intensified review procedures of
"Id. at 3.
"CENSUS BUREAU. Housing Characteristics for Selected Metropolitan Areas: 1982. 1978, 1975 and 1970,
ANNUAL HOUsING SURVEY (1982).
2Id.
2 Basuk & Gerson, supra note 10.
In urban areas where the housing market sports low vacancy rates the problem is even more severe.
Obviously homeless individuals are very, very poor and cannot afford anything more than the lowest
cost housing. When the overall vacancy rate in urban rental units is low the availability of low cost
housing tends to decrease. When urban areas offer tax incentives to convert low income housing to
luxury housing, the vacancy rate may remain stable, or even increase, but the assessibility of housing
stock for potentially homeless individuals decreases. Single room occupancy hotels seeking to convert
to condominiums raise rent levels above the public assistance allotment, which forces low-income
tenants into the streets or, if there is room, into the shelters. With no mailing address they no longer
receive public assistance checks or other mail. It is in this manner that the detachment from society
characteristic of homelessness begins.
Collin, supra note 3, at 323.
"There are striking differences in employment rates in American cities. Raleigh, Phoenix, Dallas - Fort
Worth, Austin, Manchester and Portland have employment rates of approximately 96 percent. Cleveland,
Detroit, Buffalo, Newark, Birmingham and Gary have employment rates of approximately 79 percent. It
should be noted that black, teen-age males bear the brunt of unemployment trends. It should be emphasized
that the employment rate does not consider those who are no longer actively seeking employment. Both
long-term and structural unemployment are not measured with common indices of employment com-
parability.
Anthony Downs (Brookings Institute) points out that cities with high unemployment have populations
who are not mobile. These include young people attached to their families, homeowners who can not sell
their homes, and those tied to a welfare system. Many laid-off workers can not transfer their skills to new
systems of production. Cities with high employment tend to have low vacancy rates, high property values
and little public transit. These characteristics from both types of cities act to prevent transfer of labor market
demand, although there has been some migration from the ranks of the unemployed. These people tend to
become part of the homeless population. See Kurtz, Land of Full Employment, Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly
Ed., January 21, 1985. See also Collin, Homelessness, 8 Urb. St. & Local Law Newsletter 2 (Scholar's Col-
umn) (1985).
"See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599 (1980).
Winter, 19871 HOMELESSNESS
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welfare recipients, combined with stricter eligibility requirements, has resulted
in many qualified claimants losing their benefits. Any evaluation of the loss of
benefits does not include denied new applications.25 Often the loss of benefits is
due to the limited ability on the part of the recipient to challenge the ruling. It
is readily apparent that large holes in the safety net exist, and that our nation's
scant domestic programs are in part responsible for a hungry, homeless popula-
tion roving from city to city in search of sustenance.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF SUBSISTANCE RIGHTS
There is no federally guaranteed right to subsistence in the United States
Constitution.26 Equal protection27 limitations are placed on a government
which does pass a law creating subsistence benefits,2" but there is no constitu-
tional requirement that the government create such a benefits program. Tradi-
tionally, the Supreme Court has employed two separate tests, rational relation-
ship and strict scrutiny, to review legislation challenged under the equal pro-
tection clause. Strict scrutiny is applied when legislative classifications
discriminate on the basis of suspect classes - race, nationality, or alienage -
or infringe upon certain fundamental rights, rights which have a basis in the
Constitution.29 Application of this standard has traditionally been fatal to the
legislation under examination.3" The rational relationship test is considerably
"See CONG. Q. at 2242 (September 11, 1982).
6Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
The Supreme Court here held that the Maryland regulation imposing a $250 per month ceiling on an
AFDC grant regardless of the actual need and size of the family is not prohibited by the Social Securi-
ty Act, nor is the regulation violative of the Equal Protection Clause. A state has much latitude in
dispensing available funds. The Social Security Amendments of 1967 show that Congress fully
recognized that maximum grant regulations are permissible. The equal protection concept of over-
breadth is not relevant to state regulation in the socio-economic field. Additionally, the regulation ra-
tionally furthers the state's legitimate interest in encouraging employment and in maintaining a fair
balance between welfare families and the families of the working poor.
"U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
"See Comment, Selecting the Appropriate Standard of Review for Equal Protection Challenges to Legisla-
tion Concerning Subsistence Benefits, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 587 (1984).
Traditionally, equal protection challenges to social welfare legislation have been subject to a minimal
scrutiny, rational basis test. However, there has been a trend among the judiciary to employ a higher level of
scrutiny to social welfare legislation. In cases where there has been a denial of subsistence benefits or a
reduction in these benefits equivalent to a denial, the Supreme Court has applied intermediate scrutiny and
in some rare cases strict scrutiny. Application of the former is used when relative deprivation occurs because
of a reduction in benefits paid to recipient. Use of intermediate scrutiny enables flexibility in agency distribu-
tion of scarce economic resources while providing greater protection of individual rights to governmental
services. Id.
1Id. at 589.
"OSee Comment, "Intermediate Equal Protection Scrutiny of Welfare Laws that Deny Subsistence," 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 1547 (1984).
The comment recognizes that one of the dangers of applying strict or intermediate scrutiny, as opposed to
the traditional rational basis test, is that social welfare legislation could easily be invalidated. Therefore, the
judiciary must exercise control in the application of heightened scrutiny. Furthermore, intermediate
scrutiny ought to be applied in those instances where subsistence benefits are denied discriminatorily
because individuals are a member of what is termed a "sensitive class." The Comment defines the
characteristics and traits of a "sensitive class' signaling application of intermediate scrutiny.
[Vol. 20:3
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more lenient, requiring the judiciary to uphold a classification if it bears a ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate government interest.3'
Until recently, courts, in deciding cases involving subsistence rights, em-
ployed the rational relationship test to determine whether the laws or regula-
tions at issue afforded equal protection to the parties involved. Most recently
in Dandridge v. Williams," the Supreme Court, in a case involving a law im-
posing maximum levels regardless of family size in a state income maintenance
program, applied the rational relationship test because they could find no in-
vidious discrimination which could justify a heightened level of review.
In United States Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno," a case involving
a statute denying food stamps to households containing one or more unrelated
individuals, the Supreme Court held that the state's interest in minimizing
fraud in the food stamp program did not justify the denial of food stamp
assistance to all otherwise eligible households. In the companion case to
Moreno, United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,34 the Court in-
validated a statute which denied food stamp eligibility to households of in-
dividuals who had been claimed as tax deductions during the previous year.
The statute was intended to prevent children, generally college students, of
wealthy families from abusing the system, but the court found the statute un-
constitutional because of this irrebuttable nature." In both of these cases, the
Court employed a heightened form of review to invalidate statutes which,
while rationally related to a legitimate state interest, had the effect of com-
pletely denying subsistence benefits to a group of persons.
In Price v. Cohn,36 the Third Circuit decided a case where a state statute
denied for nine months of the year general assistance benefits to all persons be-
tween the ages of 18 and 45. An earlier Third Circuit case, Medora v.
Colautti,"7 had indicated that a heightened form of scrutiny would be ap-
"City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976)
This case concerned a constitutional challenge to a municipal ordinance prohibiting food vending in the
streets of the French Quarter except for those vendors who had continually been operating the same
business within the Quarter for eight years. The Supreme Court found it had jurisdiction to review the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals which struck the ordinance invalid, and reversed it, holding that the ordinance
rationally furthered the legitimate purpose of preserving the appearance and customs of the French Quarter.
32397 U.S. 471 (1970).
33413 U.S. 528 (1973).
-413 U.S. 508 (1973).
"Id. at 513.
36715 F. 2d 87 (3d Cir. 1983).
The Third Circuit upheld a provision of the Pennsylvania Welfare Code denying benefits for nine months
of the year to those who would otherwise be entitled to the benefit for the entire year, but for that they were
18 to 45 years old and did not meet specific categories established by legislation. This distinction in age and
between the chronically and transitionally needy was held to be a reasonable means for furthering the
legitimate state interests of reallocating scarce welfare sources to those most in need and encouraging those
best able to become self-supporting. As such, the provision did not violate equal protection.
3"602 F. 2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1979).
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (DPW) regulation requiring the blind, aged or disabled to ap-
ply for federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits prior to applying for state general assistance and
Winter, 19871 HOMELESSNESS
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plicable where a classification denied, as opposed to reduced, benefits to a class
of persons. However, the Price court found the Dandridge case to be control-
ling and distinguished Medora, holding that the rational relation test was ap-
propriate in Price.
Commentators have theorized that the Price decision can be squared with
Dandridge and distinguished from Murry and Moreno in that the latter cases
involved an absolute ban on eligibility on certain classes of persons while the
former case involved a reduction of benefits for certain groups. 8 Leaving aside
the Dandridge case, the facts of Price are such as to question the ap-
propriateness of this distinction while accepting it as legally correct.
In Price the denial of benefits was for nine months of the year to that class
of persons deemed by the legislature to be employable, namely all of those able
bodied between the ages of 18 and 45. Evidence was adduced at trial to show
that persons in this age group were, on average, more likely than persons in the
remaining age groups to be able to find a job once unemployed. But further
evidence was presented by those attacking the statute that while this was true
for the population as a whole, it was not true for those persons who were
receiving welfare benefits. This difference was attributed to the fact that this
class of persons generally had few, if any, marketable job skills and had poor
work histories. In addition, in low skill jobs employers have little incentive to
discriminate against older job applicants with fewer working years ahead of
them, as little training is necessary and therefore little investment is made in
each worker.3 9
Further evidence showed that many persons denied general assistance
under the challenged statute were likely to end up without a source of support
and, for some, homeless. It was argued that this circle feeds on itself, as a
deprived or homeless is unable to find a job, thereby creating long term pover-
ty out of what was previously transitional need."
What is clear from the foregoing is that:
(1) federal courts have, to some extent, begun to recognize the fundamen-
tal need which subsistence benefits satisfy by applying a somewhat
heightened form of scrutiny to laws which terminate eligibility for
benefits for any group of needy persons; and
(2) attempting to draw a distinction between a termination and reduction
in benefits may be disingenous to the point of being farcical.
barred such a person from applying for the more liberal general assistance benefits if found ineligible for SSI
held to violate the equal protection clause. The regulation discriminated among similarly situated persons
and did not rationally further any legitimate governmental interest.
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HOMELESSNESS
In order to equally protect all groups, it is necessary to draw rational lines
which properly delineate between the deserving and the undeserving poor.
This is not a constitutional mandate which can be enforced by courts, at least
according to present interpretations of the equal protection clause. However, it
is important that courts have begun to recognize that subsistence rights, so in-
timately intertwined with the exercise of rights that are explicitly protected in
the Constitution, are worthy of some protection against arbitrary delineations
of deserving and undeserving by lawmakers.
The range and severity of the problems of the homeless alerted public in-
terest attorneys to the duties of state and local government for the needy. The
first, groundbreaking case was Callaghan v. Carey.4
JUDICIAL FORAYS INTO HOMELESSNESS
On October 2 and 18, 1979, attorneys moved for a preliminary injunction
seeking an order that defendants provide adequate shelter to those homeless
men who apply for it.
During the next year-and-a-half plaintiffs were in court three times seek-
ing enforcement of the injunction while the case was in litigation. The chosen
observers maintained that there were still not enough beds for the homeless
men and that the shelters were still not up to the standards set by law. Finally,
without final adjudication of any issue of fact or law, an agreement between ci-
ty and state officials and the plaintiffs was reached. The agreement provided
that sanitary and safe shelter and board be supplied to each homeless man who
applies for it as long as the man meets the need standard to qualify for the
home relief established in New York State, or the man, by reason of physical,
mental, or social dysfunction, is in need of temporary shelter. Enforcement of
the agreement, called "the Callahan Decree," has presented problems. The Ci-
ty has frequently delayed implementation of the decree. In October of 198 1, as
temperatures in New York City began to drop, plaintiffs obtained a court or-
der mandating action by the City to enforce the decree. Despite initial argu-
ments by the City that no acceptable shelter could be found on such short no-
tice, City officials managed to locate a vacant school building in Brooklyn the
next day. That night approximately 200 men were sheltered in that building.
Homeless individuals have also been involved in first amendment issues.
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence, plaintiffs camped in a park
in Washington, D.C. to
re-enact the central reality of homelessness, in a highly visible public place
in the dead of winter, in order to express the message that the plight of
homeless people is serious and too often ignored."2
'
1N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979 at 10, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1979).
'
2Clarke v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 52 U.S.L.W. 4986 (1984).
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The questions presented were whether the respondent's act of sleeping
outdoors in a public place in the dead of winter to convey the plight of
homeless people is sufficiently expressive to warrant first amendment protec-
tion; and if so, whether petitioners have failed to demonstrate a sufficiently
substantial interest to justify suppressing it. The Supreme Court held:
Aside from its impact on speech, a rule against camping or overnight
sleeping in public parks is not beyond the constitutional power of the
Government to enforce. And as noted above, there is a substantial
Government interest, unrelated to suppression of expression, in conserv-
ing park property that is served by the proscription of sleeping. 3
This case represents not only one of the parameters of homeless litigation,
but also an avenue of political expression denied to homeless persons." The
homeless are now pursuing relief from their destitution through federal and
state legislation.
AID FOR FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN BENEFITS: A CASE STUDY OF
STANDARDS APPLIED TO DETERMINE ELIGIBILITY
In order to determine the proper basis for delineating between the deserv-
ing and the undeserving poor, there is the need to find the philosophical basis
for public welfare programs. In the United States, there is no federal constitu-
tional right to subsistence. 5 Any right to welfare benefits is the result of
statutory enactments and the legal and constitutional requirements which at-
tach to them. There are a number of areas in which the various levels of
government have created these statutory rights: Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC), Old Age Survivors Disability Insurance (OASDI),
4Id.
"Homelessness also affects the eligibility to vote. States can impose bona fide citizenship, residency, and age
requirements for state and local elections. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978)
(upholding residency requirement); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) (upholding limited durational
residency requirement); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (persons living on grands of National In-
stitutes of Health, a federal enclave within Maryland's borders may not be excluded from voting in
Maryland elections); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (members of armed services living in Texas may
not be automatically excluded from state elections); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating
one-year state and three-month county durational residency requirements on both Equal Protection and
right to travel grounds); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding Title I1 of the Voting Act
Amendments of 1970, which abolished residency requirements for presidential and vice presidential elec-
tions). SEE M. GELFAND. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1984),
chapter one for an excellent synopsis of constitutional aspects of elections and voting rights. See also Collin,
Voting Rights for the Homeless (forthcoming in Stetson Law Review); Collin, Homelessness as a Local
Issue, W. CITIES. 12 (March 1986).
43San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrieguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32-34 and n. 72 (1973).
The Supreme Court held that Texas' school-financing system, based on state runding supplemented by an
ad valorem tax on property within each local district, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the four-
teenth amendment, even though the system disadvantaged those living in comparatively poor school
districts. Strict scrutiny was inappropriate because the class created by the financing system was not found
to be suspect, nor is education a fundamental right with which the Texas system impermissibly interfered.
The system bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, basic education for every child, and
local participation and control of the schools within each district.
[Vol. 20:3
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Social Security Income (SSI), food stamps, unemployment insurance, and
Medicaid are just a few examples. Each of these programs includes a set of
rules and regulations which includes some and excludes others. Besides the
substantive laws in question, there are the procedural rules which also act as
filtering agents between the applicant and the recipient. In order to ascertain
the standards of fault which are used to determine whether a recipient is eligi-
ble for aid, one must start with the rules and their applications which deter-
mine how allocational decisions are made.
AFDC is a federally financed state aid plan for providing aid to families of
needy, dependent children. A state choosing to participate in this program is
required to formulate a program consistent with federal statutes and regula-
tions, and any state mandated requirement inconsistent with federal law and
regulations is invalid.' However, states are allowed, within the federal
guidelines, to design the administrative mechanism for implementing the
federal program. The federal control of the program is powerful, creating a
method of administration which is rule oriented, centralized, and bureaucratic
as opposed to earlier programs and many current state run general assistance
programs, which are discretionary and decentralized.47
While the replacement of discretion by rules has been a giant step toward
eliminating arbitrary determinations of fault from the administration of
welfare benefits, such determinations are still present in the rules which define
administration of the AFDC program, and to a far greater degree, in the state
and locally controlled general assistance programs.
As a starting point, it is necessary to outline the overall structure of in-
come assistance programs. AFDC is just one of a number of federal and state
income maintenance programs. The federal programs operate by designating
groups, or categories, of individuals eligible to participate in them. While eligi-
bility for participation in a program may require a demonstration of need, all
programs require an applicant to meet other criteria as well, and some pro-
grams require no showing of need. Two widely utilized programs of the latter
type are Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, (OASDI or Social Se-
curity) and Unemployment Insurance. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) re-
quires a showing of need, combined with a requirement that the applicant be
either aged, blind or disabled. Other programs, such as public housing, Food
'Arizona State Department of Public Welfare v. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 449 F. 2d
456 (9th Cir. 1971).
This decision affirmed the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare's final decision finding that certain
public assistance plans in Arizona failed to conform to federal law and regulations. Arizona's automatic ter-
mination of welfare eligibility after 90-day absence, its disregard of earned income for the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and its failure to create an advisory committee AFDC-Child
Welfare Services (CWS) were in conflict with valid federal requirements. In addition, Arizona's custody re-
quirement for AFDC did not satisfy the mandatory condition that aid to families with dependent children be
furnished with reasonable promptness.
4
'Note, Due Process in the Administration of General Assistance: Are Written Standards Protecting the In-
digent? 59 IND. L.J. 443 (1984).
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Stamps, Medicare and Medicaid, provide in kind benefits to the needy. Each of
the programs identifies a group of persons in the country in need of assistance,
and then designs a program to provide the assistance which is deemed ap-
propriate.
There is no federal program to assist the poor generally, only those
groups, including some subgroups of the poor, which fall into neatly defined
categories. In most states, there are state, county or local programs which pro-
vide general assistance to poor persons, but even these programs are often
limited to those considered unemployable. Consequently, there is in this coun-
try no general program to assist the poor, and the benefits provided by all the
programs falls far short of providing a subsistence income to recipients.
AFDC constitutes the income maintenance program which is most acces-
sible to the poor. The category of eligible individuals singled out for aid by this
program is the dependent child. For a child to be eligible, he must be both
needy and dependent.48 The term needy has been interpreted by courts to not
require destitution, and a family may be able to provide some support and still
remain eligible for assistance. 9 A child is dependent if he "has been deprived of
parental support or care by reason of death continued absence from the home
.. , or physical or mental incapacity of a parent" or, in some states, "by reason
of the unemployment ... of the parent who is the principal earner." 0 Recipi-
ents of AFDC are required to register for "manpower services, training,
employment, and other employment-related activities" in order to receive aid."
Exceptions to this requirement are allowed for recipients sixteen years of age
or under who are attending secondary school, or those who are incapacitated,
elderly, obligated to care for an incapacitated person or child under the age of
six, already working, or if the other parent is obligated to register for the pro-
gram.52 Those refusing employment or participation in the Work Incentive
Program may have their benefits terminated. 3
Given these rules concerning eligibility for the AFDC program, what
delineation of deserving and undeserving poor is attempted by the program?
Quite understandably, the program attempts to delineate between the
4181 L.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 116 (1977).
"Bryant v. Swoap, 48 Cal. App. 3d 431, 121 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1975).
Under the California Department of Benefits Payments regulation, eligibility for AFDC benefits was con-
ditioned on the following: "A child is eligible on the basis of age until his 18th birthday only if he is unmar-
ried." The Department construed the term "unmarried" to mean never married. Such a reading of the regu-
lation excludes from the AFDC program children who are married and divorced but still have a right to pa-
rental support and who were otherwise eligible. In construing the eligibility requirement, the court held the
term "unmarried" to mean "not presently married," so as not to exclude the class of children described
above.
1042 U.S.C.A. Section 606(a), 607(a) (West. Supp. 1986).
1142 U.S.C.A. Section 602(a), (19) (West. Supp. 1986).
5242 U.S.C.A. Section 602(a)(19)(A) (West. Supp. 1986).
1142 U.S.C.A. Section 602(a)(I 9)(F) (West. Supp. 1986).
[Vol. 20:3
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needy and the not needy. Some of the income maintenance programs include
vast numbers of persons who are not poor, but these programs perform func-
tions other than relieving poverty. The goal of this program is to relieve pover-
ty; consequently, exclusion of those not considered needy is not inconsistent
with the goals of the program.
How is need to be measured? It is not necessary that the family be
destitute,54 but must generally be without funds or assets necessary to meet the
expenses of life as determined by the local social services agency. The AFDC
award is generally much less than the recognized poverty level.
The issue of availability of assets can, in some cases, present particularly
difficult problems. Most AFDC applicants do not possess any consequential
assets, but some applicants are fortunate enough to own or have substantial
equity in their homes. It is customary to refuse aid to families who own their
own home,5 and where aid is provided it is legal to condition the aid on a
promise to reimburse the government, and to require the applicant to give the
government a lien on the home as security for the agreement to reimburse.16
Persons in this situation are faced with a difficult choice, perhaps a choice the
government should not force them to make. While it is entirely reasonable to
require that a family sell assets not intimately associated with subsistence, it is
hardly conducive to long term economic well being of the poor and near poor
to force them to sell their homes as a condition to receiving aid. One who owns
a house is likely to be in need of aid for only a short period of time, and allow-
ing them to retain ownership of the house is probably likely to decrease future
needs to revert to public aid. Strictly on efficiency grounds, this rule may con-
stitute bad policy.
It also seems unfair to force a family to rid itself of all assets before apply-
ing for temporary aid when the bankruptcy code allows those who are unable
to meet their debts to retain some assets, with many states allowing the debtor
family to retain a house, two automobiles and various other assets. It would
seem wiser to allow the applicant to retain those assets necessary to pursue a
search for employment.
'Bryant v. Swoap, 48 Cal. App. 3d 431, 121 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1975).
"Begay v. Graham, 18 Ariz. App. 336, 501 P. 2d 964 (1972).
In affirming the State board of Welfare's decision to deny appellants surplus commodity assistance, the
Arizona Court of Appeals held that the term "fair market value" as used in the statute, providing for
eligibility for surplus commodity assistance and assistance to dependent children to be based on the amount
of property or assets the child's parents possess, means the fair market value of the owners' interest in the
property after the deduction of the amount of any outstanding and unpaid mortgage lien, encumbrance or
security interest. This interpretation of the statute would be prospective only.
'Charleston v. Wohigemuth, 332 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
Pennsylvania welfare regulations required AFDC applicants owning certain types of property to agree to
reimburse the state for assistance received, and to give the state a lien on the property as security. These reg-
ulations, the District court held, were not in conflict with the Social Security Act by imposing a condition of
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A dependent child is one who lacks parental support, either through
death, disability, continued absence, or unemployment of a parent. By requir-
ing that parental support be sent before aid be granted, the statute draws a line
between the deserving and the undeserving poor which encourages activities
not healthy to the social and economic fabric of the country. The prevalence of
female headed households is probably the most widely cited result of this
policy, but there are other, less visible results as well.
First, if the object is to provide aid only to the deserving, the line between
present and absent parents is irrational. True, the statute does provide for aid
in the event of unemployment, but only about half of the states participate in
this program. In those states which do not participate, the absence or inability
of a parent is required in order to qualify for AFDC.
Even in those states which do participate, a parent's participation in the
labor force is required in order for the remainder of the family to receive aid.57
This seems particularly harsh. If the object of the program is to provide sup-
port to children who need it, the fact that a parent fails to live up to his or her
responsibility does not make the child any less deserving of aid. The analytical-
ly correct approach would be to provide aid to the child while pursuing reme-
dies against the irresponsible parent. In this way, the child (and often the
mother as well) are not deprived as a result of actions not for which he is re-
sponsible.
The current rules under which AFDC operates have resulted in other de-
serving families being denied assistance. One particularly egregious example of
this involves a newly married California couple, the husband a 17 year old full
time high school student with a pregnant wife.58 According to the court, the
family was not eligible for AFDC benefits because the husband, who expected
to graduate from high school, was not an unemployed parent due to the fact
that his work experience established that he was capable of engaging in a gain-
ful occupation so that his attendance at school was not essential to his self sup-
port. Aside from being totally counterproductive, this decision is wholly unjust
"Trull v. Department of Public Welfare, 268 A. 2d 859 (D.C. App. 1970).
The District of Columbia Director of Public Welfare terminated Mrs. Trull's assistance payments for six
of her nine children. The Court of Appeals held that although the father refused to work and support the
family the children were not qualified to receive AFDC assistance payments, because the father was living
at home and was able-bodied and employable. The D.C. AFDC program regulations required that the child
must be deprived of the care and support of at least one parent by reason of death, incapacity or continued
absence from the home. Such was not the case here.
"SMadera County v. Carleson, 32 Cal. App. 3d 764, 108 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1973).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a 17-year old married with a pregnant wife high school stu-
dent's application for benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC). The
applicant did not qualify for the program because he was not an "unemployed parent" for AFDC purposes,
as defined by statute. For the applicant who was attending high school full-time voluntarily, rather than as a
result of unemployment.
Carleson has been overruled by Frink v. Prod, 181 Cal. Rptr. 893, 31 Cal. 3d 172 (1982) which held that
the independent judgment standard shall be applied to decisions denying applications for welfare benefits,
rather than the substantial evidence rule used in Carleson.
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in its determination that one who is completing high school is disqualified from
public aid because he is doing so. The possession of a high school diploma in
our time is the sine qua non of minimal marketable job skills, and to deny aid
to an applicant because he is pursuing his diploma is inexcusable.
Perhaps the worst injustice is visited on those who, although fully em-
ployed, are in need of public aid. With a minimum wage rate in covered indus-
tries of $3.35 per hour, a family of four with one full time wage earner falls ap-
proximately $3,500 short of the poverty line, before taxes. Those in poverty
are likely to work less than a full year, or in industries not covered by the mini-
mum wage law. Consequently, they are quite unlikely, if fully employed, even
if fully employed for the entire year, to reach the poverty line. Even in those
states which provide AFDC benefits to be paid to families with unemployed
parents, full employment is an absolute bar to the family's receipt of aid,
regardless of the amount of income which is realized from this employment.
59
Clearly, this provision punishes behavior which should be encouraged.
But in addition, it places the employed in the category of undeserving poor,
even though by working they are pursuing a course which lessens their respon-
sibility for their poverty. By punishing them for their industriousness (or their
luck), the AFDC rule has created a poor delineation between the deserving and
the undeserving poor in this case.
LEGAL AND WELFARE ADVOCACY
Local coalitions and church organizations have developed important ad-
vocacy functions as the problem of poverty has increased in severity. This has
developed through the services these groups provide for indigent populations.
Although their efforts meet only a small portion of the need, they tend to be
the only provider of essential services. Therefore, their advocacy has been
developing in the manner of traditional welfare advocacy.
61
However, so overwhelming have been both the needs and growth of the
homeless population that legal advocacy groups have formed. The dimensions
of the homeless problem, and concomitant urgency have created new demands
on the public sector. The public sector has the resources, in terms of shelter op-
tions and planning expertise, to ameliorate many of the basic needs of the
"Hart v. Juras, 522 P. 2d 1399, 17 Or. App. 566 (1974).
The Oregon Court of Appeals held that the amount of the petitioners' monthly income was not deter-
minative of his eligibility for benefits under the Aid to Dependent Children with an Unemployed Father
(ADC-UN) program. The activities directly relating to the operation of his business, such as time spent
repairing the building from which his business was operated were properly considered as "employment" for
purposes of program eligibility standards.
10Traditional welfare advocacy involved increasing the accessibility of welfare entitlements to poverty
populations. It was implemented by informing citizens eligible for welfare, helping them apply, and ad-
vocating on their behalf through the entire process. Its overall goal was to mobilize the poorest people into a
political force by expanding welfare rolls and pressuring the state to increase the level of entitlement. See
POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS (1979).
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homeless. However, the tremendous cost and complexity of the needs of the
homeless have created much resistance on the part of the public sector. This,
combined with the aforementioned federal cutbacks, has created obstacles so
insurmountable that most advocacy efforts were forced into adversarial posi-
tions.
There are inherent limits upon legal advocacy. States which do not have a
constitutional or statutory basis create an inhospitable environment for ad-
vocation of shelter needs. Another limitation of legal advocacy is that it is time
consuming. This increases the cost to a population with very little resources.
Another limitation is that implementation of judicial decisions is often
muted by the reluctance of urban governments to implement costly decisions.
Narrow interpretations of the law by these governments, whether it be con-
stitutional, statutory, or caselaw, drain time and money from the limited
resources of advocacy groups. The most severe limitation of legal advocacy is
that only the most needy symptoms of a desperate case are litigated. The
underlying causes and other important problematic facets of homelessness are
not addressed. This is why legislative initiatives are needed to move public
resources to provide for the basic needs of the poorest poor. Ecologically, it is
more efficient to move resources toward prevention than late partial remedies
surrounded by litigation.
THE NEW HOMELESSNESS LEGISLATION
United States
The distinguishing feature of all the federal approaches is that there is lit-
tle recognition of a right to shelter and, concomitantly, no establishment of ap-
propriate federal funding mechanisms for the homeless. Indeed, in a congres-
sional hearing of the House Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations
and Human Resources, Paul Wright of the General Accounting Office report-
ed that only $200,000 had been spent of the $8 million that the Department of
Defense had received for sites for use as emergency shelters.6 Representative
William Boner (D-Tenn.) chaired a hearing of the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives' Subcommittee on Housing and Consumer Interests on the homeless.62
The hearing resulted in a bill that would have provided for a study of health
care services for the homeless.63 The provision was contained in an amendment
to the Health Professions and Services Act of 1984 (S-2574). The amendment
would have required the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
"Federal Response to Homeless Crisis, House Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and Human
Resolves, 98th Congress (2nd Sess.) 174 (Nov. 20, 1984). See also Homelessness, A Complex Problem and
the Federal Response, Government Office of Accounting, 39 (April 9, 1985).
62Rep. Boner had recently spent two days and nights on the streets of Nashville posing as a homeless man.
Homelessness in Nashville, House Subcommittee on Housing and Consumer Interest, 98th Cong. 2nd Sess.
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Services to conduct a study of health care needs of the homeless, and to report
the findings within a year. It also would have required an evaluation of current
eligibility requirements that prevent the homeless from receiving health care
services." This bill was vetoed by President Reagan in October 1985. President
Reagan's 1985 budget provisions for the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) are $3.2 billion less than the previous year.
Homelessness issues will continue to fall into the laps of local planners as
a politicized hot potato. However, there is a glimmer of hope on the federal
horizon. The Housing Act of 1985 (H.R. 1) has been passed by the House. It
was designed to address the issues of long and short term housing for poor peo-
ple by providing funds for subsidized housing and other programs that would
make resources available for poor and homeless people. Part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (H.R. 3500), the bill would authorize $20.5
billion for housing programs, including $14.3 billion in new funds for fiscal
1986 housing and community development programs operated by the Depart-
ments of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Agriculture.
This $14.3 billion includes $9.2 billion for assisted housing, and would
support an additional 91.509 dwellings, including 66,209 existing Section 8
housing units, 6,200 units of Section 8 moderately rehabilitated housing,
12,100 units of housing for the elderly and handicapped, 5,000 units of public
housing, and 2,000 units of Indian housing. $2.3 billion was authorized for
loans for rural housing, including $1.3 billion for home ownership and $900
million for rental housing, to support a total of 63,000 units.
In addition, a total of $216 million would be authorized to aid the nation's
homeless. $66 million of that amount would go to the emergency food and
shelter assistance program administered by the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA); $50 million would go to a new program of grants to
nonprofit groups to acquire and rehabilitate structures for the homeless, and
for technical assistance in providing housing and support services as an alter-
native to institutionalization; and $100 million would fund grants, to be
matched by state and local governments, to renovate buildings for use as
shelters for the homeless and for basic services.
The British Housing (Homeless Persons) Act of 1977
Britain enacted the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act in 1977. The main
"See CONF. REP., 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 1143, 1147, 1169.
11FY 1987 Budget proposals contain large reductions. Rural Housing would suffer a 75% rescission of
$ 1.525 billion. Housing Development Action Grants are to be cut by $99.5 million. Moderate rehabilitation
is cut by $239 million and low income programs are to be cut by $91 million. These cuts are expected to
reduce the number of additional low income households provided with housing assistance by about a third,
from 150,000 housing units in 1987 to about 100,000 units in 1988. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORrriES, 4 (January 1987).
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purpose of the act is to prevent and ameliorate the effects of homelessness." It
placed a series of statutory duties upon housing authorities to provide accom-
modation, advice, and assistance to the homeless. It transferred responsibility
for homelessness from social service departments to housing departments.
Under the Act a person is homeless if he has no accommodation. A per-
son is homeless even with accommodation if he can not secure entry to it, or it
is probable that occupation of it will lead to violence from some other person
residing in it, or it consists of a movable structure and there is no place he is
permitted to place it. Under the Act, a person is threatened with homelessness
if it is likely that he will become homeless within 28 days. Those claiming
homelessness are placed in a preferred position if they can establish that they
are in "priority need." There are three categories of priority need. They are in-
dividuals with dependent children, individuals who are homeless as a result of
a disaster, individuals who are physically or mentally disabled or who might be
expected to reside with such an individual, and pregnant women and those
who might be reasonably expected to reside with a pregnant woman.
The Act defines "intentional homelessness" with great particularity.
Under the Act, a person becomes homeless intentionally if he deliberately does
or fails to do something which causes him to cease to occupy accommodations
which are available for his occupation and which would have been reasonable
for him to continue to occupy. The Act further states that one is homeless in-
tentionally if he deliberately does or fails to do something the likely result of
which is that he will be forced to leave the accommodation which is available.
"Intentionality" is determined from an objective view point, not from the sub-
jective intention of the applicant.
The Act has run into several obstacles in its implementation. The chart
below came from application statistics for accommodation in England in 1979:
Relatives/friends no longer able/willing to accommodate 46%
Marital dispute 9%
Illegal letting/eviction 7%
Court order/unable to pay 18%
Loss of service tenancy 5%
Had to leave unprotected accommodation 8%
Other reasons (includes fire, flood and sleeping rough) 8%
The chart indicates that the main reason for homelessness of persons in Britain
is that relatives or friends are no longer willing or able to accommodate them.
It does not indicate whether the friends or relatives are residing in England. A
major concern of many British local authorities is that the Act has made them
"THE PUBLIC GENERAL ACTS AND GENERAL SYNOD MEASURES, Public Act of 1977, Housing (Homeless Per-
sons) Act, Part 11, Chapter 48, 1107-1125 (1977). See also Housing Act of 1985, Part Ill, Chapters 58-78,
86-103 (HALSBURYS STATUES 4th ed. vol. 21).
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"the housing authority of the world" because they had ports or international
airports in their jurisdiction. The fear and actuality that public resources will
be distributed to non-residents positively atrophies human service planners and
politicians. To redress the problem, those responsible for the program revised
the texts of leaflets issued by British embassies to include reminders to prospec-
tive immigrants to make proper accommodation before they arrive. The im-
migration rules have been changed to the effect of making it necessary for
those who wish to obtain admission of their dependents to the United
Kingdom for settlement be able to demonstrate that they can accommodate
them without recourse to public funds in accommodations that they
themselves own or occupy.
Some judicial gloss has been added to this policy line. It was held in
Eastleigh Borough Council v. Betts67 that a local council could validly establish
a guideline that an individual who had lived in the area for less than six months
had no local connection with the area. It was also held that the local council
must consider the facts of any particular case, including the intention to stay in
the area.
A still more pervasive and complex problem is the issue of "intentional
homelessness." If a person is intentionally homeless then they are not within
the ambit of the Act. Again, this distinction permeates all poverty law; inten-
tional versus unintentional homelessness, involuntarily in need versus uninten-
tional homelessness, involuntarily in need versus voluntarily needy, and the
truly needy versus those not truly needy. It is a policy objective not to allocate
public welfare resources to anyone but those who actually need them. While a
laudable and pragmatic policy, it is very fine line to discern for those who ad-
minister the programs.
Despite a major code revision, people are considered intentionally home-
less for a variety of reasons. For example, a person who chooses to sell his
home, or who lost it because of willful and persistent refusal to pay rent is con-
sidered intentionally homeless. Also, when a person has voluntarily resigned
from a job, he or she will be treated as intentionally homeless if it is deemed
reasonable to continue in the employment. The British legislation is directed
not at those who are in fact homeless, but to those who are homeless through
no fault of their own. In a rapidly changing post-industrial society is it increas-
ingly difficult to assign "fault" for the lack of a basic need. Inherent in the need
for housing is the ability to pay for it. The ability to pay for it is dependent
upon the cost (supply and demand) and the income of the individual. The in-
come of the individual is dependent upon society's demand for his or her labor.
A trait of post-industrial societies is rapidly shifting demands from the labor
force as well as an overall decline in demand. This is in part due to the develop-
ment of production technologies that require fewer man-hours. Thus, "inten-
" Eastleigh Borough Council v. Betts [19831 2 All E.R. II11.
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tionality" of homelessness loses its relevance in light of the inability of the in-
dividual to control his or her marketability in the labor force.
New Developments in the States
The State of Massachusetts is at the cutting edge of legislative and admin-
istrative attempts to meet the problem of homelessness, in both an immediate
and preventive manner.61 One of the main ways Massachusetts has immediate-
ly dealt with homeless needs is to come to terms with the definition of "resi-
dent." The reason that this has been a problem is that many human services,
especially public ones, distribute resources on the basis of the residency of the
recipient. While this may extend coverage it will not meet the need if residency
is necessary for eligibility requirements. Problems of transiency and verifica-
tion requirements present insurmountable obstacles for homeless populations.
Indeed, these two problems are the reasons for the inefficiency with which
many fragmented human services are delivered. Massachusetts has uniquely
defined "resident" as one "with no present intention of definite and early re-
moval" and "not necessarily with the intention of remaining permanently,"
thus overcoming stultifying questions about public jurisdiction and respon-
sibility.
The state will match funds on a 3:1 ratio with all other "non-state"
sources. Non-state sources specifically include city and county governments.
Local planning processes regarding shelter for the homeless traditionally
evolve around a policy of eliminating them from their residential and commer-
cial areas. The broad scope of possible providers, given a nonstate
nomenclature, may counteract exclusionary tendencies at the local level. The
act is as preventive as the federal government will allow it. It mandates tem-
porary shelter when the family has no feasible alternative housing available,
up to the maximum period subject to federal reimbursement. Moving ex-
penses, storage of furniture, advance rent payments, and a security deposit are
provided to prevent distribution.
From the Massachusetts legislation we see evidence of a demographically
sensitive human service planning process, albeit, not so right from the start,
but nonetheless thoroughly incorporated in the present programs delivering
services. However, their coverage of the population is very similar to Britain's,
that is, one that is limited to "families and pregnant women." The inherent
nature of detachment in many homeless prevent familial bonds. Many single
and homeless individuals are excluded from the present provision of services,
and therefore, are excluded from demographically sensitive planning
mechanisms incorporated in the present service and delivery framework. 69 Ap-
parently, the Massachusetts statute will confront some of the same problems
"MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 450 (West 1983).
6"See Collin, The Demographic Sensitivity of Human Service Planning (July 1983) (unpublished master's
thesis available in Columbia University School of Architecture and Planning Library).
[Vol. 20:3
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as the British Act, that is, targeting services to those truly needy, but single. In-
tentionality of homelessness has not yet arisen as an issue in Massachusetts. A
literal reading of the Massachusetts statute is that anyone "who enters the
Commonwealth solely for the purposes of obtaining benefits under this
chapter shall not be considered a resident." If there has been an assignment or
transfer of real or personal property for the purposes of becoming eligible
within one year immediately prior the filing for application for services, there
is no emergency assistance granted. Although not specifically mentioned, these
two aspects of the Massachusetts state touch on the intent with which one
seeks aid. This is to be distinguished from the British approval which is prem-
ised on the intention with which one becomes homeless. Although the two are
interrelated, the distinction is important in terms of recipient populations.
Massachusetts may have avoided many problems of implementation by con-
fining intent to seeking aid, and at the same time observe a policy goal of fiscal
restraint. It recognizes that people may become intentionally homeless but are
not motivated by lures of free public money, are nonetheless in need. This is
much more in accord with the labor-market fluctuations and changes inherent
in post-industrial societies.
DELINEATION OF DESERVING AND UNDESERVING POOR BASED ON
THE GOAL OF JUSTICE
"Welfare policies, like any form of redistribution of wealth, are always in-
troduced in the name of justice."70 Consequently, any program should be
designed, to the maximum feasible extent, to treat all members of society just-
ly. Formal justice requires equal treatment of all those who belong to the rele-
vant category, but the decision concerning the choice of the relevant category
is beyond the scope of the concept of justice." It appears reasonable, based on
political consensus and history, that the relevant group in this case should be
those unable to provide for themselves and all those so able who are willing to
do so. Equal treatment would mean the right to a standard of living which is
consistent with membership in the general society.
The above description attempts to come to grips with the conflict between
formal justice and distributive justice where, according to the latter, unequal
treatment may be justified as necessary to obtain equality in the satisfaction of
needs. The egalitarian approach implied by any system of substantial
(distributive) justice is laden with practical implications which render it not on-
ly impractical but highly undesirable. For example, any egalitarian system
faces massive problems of efficiency, control, bureaucratization, and social
uniformity." Any system of distributive justice involves an unacceptable level
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of interference with personal lives. Even the most ardent redistributionists
would recognize the propriety of abandoning an egalitarian policy if doing so
would make everyone better off."
As a starting point, it is necessary to recognize that the economic/political/
social system which allows for the accumulation of wealth by some and the ex-
treme poverty of others is the product of a social pact - partly explicit, partly
implicit - which now exists. Only with the tacit acceptance of all is the system
able to operate so as to generate mammoth amounts of wealth. Conversely, the
talents of some of generate disproportionate amounts of wealth. Given this ar-
rangement whereby the cooperation of all is required, the means necessary for
full participation in the society should be available to all. Thus, a system which
creates unemployment for some in order that the whole shall be greater cannot
justly deprive the forcibly unemployed of participation in the fundamental ac-
tivities of society.
The standard proposed, then, is essentially a standard of fault which seeks
to ascertain responsibility for individual noncontribution to the societal whole.
Society currently recognizes numerous acceptable reasons for such noncontri-
bution, including age, disability, family responsibility, and past work history.
But there is no recognition of inferior jobs skills or lack of jobs as acceptable
reasons for noncontribution. In short, there is no recognition of the distrib-
utive shortcomings of the present system. This needs to be remedied, to serve
not only the interests of justice, but also to serve the interests of efficiency.
A system of subsistence benefits has been proposed, experimented with,
and rejected on the bases of cost and diminution of work incentive. The cost
issue is somewhat of a red herring, as it can be viewed as internalization of the
negative externalities provided by the current system of distribution. In other
works, if we can financially support a system of subsistence payments to the
truly deserving poor without decreasing total output, then has the program ac-
tually cost anything? Thus, the cost of the program lies only in its effects on in-
centives to work.
The prime deterrent to work is not the existence of any public benefits,
but the relative unattractiveness of low wages. To counteract the unattrac-
tiveness, well designed schedules are necessary which provide for income sup-
plement with the minimum of disincentive. For a single person, a full time full
year minimum wage job is almost enough to reach the poverty standard. For
the sole breadwinner in a family of four, it is not.
The recognition of the social value of the individual is necessary as well. If
the system is one in which society awards benefits to those who have fallen in-
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problem in something other than the adversarial manner in which it is now ap-
proached. This is not unprecedented.
Not long ago, welfare was treated as a privilege bestowed on persons and
revocable at the whim of the provider."' Since that time, numerous ad-
ministrative practices based on the supposed moral degeneracy of the poor
have been eliminated. Social work professionals of the New Deal era cham-
pioned the ideas that benefits be recognized as rights (to leave the beneficiary
unshackled by feelings of personal obligation to the welfare agency), that
poverty does not indicate moral failing, and that financial assistance be condi-
tioned solely on need." For the social workers of this era, a right was not an ab-
solute triumph which provided the individual with absolute insularity from the
larger society; instead, it had to be seen in the context of the social good." The
free market principles of effort and exchange were treated as just two of
several legitimate principles of distribution, with need being considered a prin-
ciple of at least equal dignity."
The fundamental concept in the framework of the New Deal social
workers is that of interdependence. They rejected the notion of a rigid distinc-
tion between the individual and the collective, instead recognizing the coopera-
tion inherent in any advanced society." In applying their principles to welfare
policy, the social workers emphasized that recognition of need as a distributive
principle was imperative for a person to function as a full member of society.79
Rather than a premise, autonomy was identified as a goal. 0
It is this sense of interdependence which is an essential element of any
successful welfare policy. The first step in creating this sense of in-
terdependence is to create a system of public welfare which explicitly seeks to
reward virtuous behavior. Some people are not able to work at all; others are
unable to find jobs for shorter periods of time. In order to treat equals equally,
we need to devise a welfare system which identifies individual responsibility as
the determinant of aid eligibility. The current system fails to do that, and only
a system based on need can do it.
"Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1 (1985).
The focus of the article is to reconcile the purpose and objective of social work theory, formulated during
the New Deal and those of the New Property right in both a legal and political context. The critical issue re-
volves around whether welfare rights should be determined by "need-based distribution, [or] is it concerned
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